After innocence, one may discover other pleasures in the milonga, other ways of dancing. Some find their way straight to this land.
There was a discussion, I think in one of Anthony Grayling's introductory philosophy classes at Birkbeck, back in around 2005 about ethics. It was specifically about pleasure and where the greatest pleasure lay, in the pure hedonism of the sensual pleasures, or in more cultural and intellectual pursuits. Grayling was an elegant orator. He never patronised us as the novitiates we in fact were, by telling. He would bestow on us the grace that of course we already knew to what he was referring, because naturally we were well informed and engaged individuals. Have people believe that you believe in their best selves and they become those very selves. He would introduce a new topic with Recall ....
Recall, then, that Jeremy Bentham's hedonistic utilitarianism posits that the best action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or pleasure and minimizes overall pain. He conveniently, if bizarrely, introduced a 'hedonistic calculus', a complicated kind of pro/con list. If you believe this is not an overly simple (or complex) approach to assessing subjective experience, or that difference types of pleasure and pain are in fact commensurable, you could try this out. Take any two alternatives and list them according to the categories (in bold, below) provided by Bentham. These are the things you are meant to consider. You could apply to them a score though Bentham did not specifically say to do this.
Action A: Going to a Concert
John Stuart Mill on the other hand says we will choose the pleasure that most appeals to us, even if we know that there may be more discontent associated with it than with the other:
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing the quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
- from 'Utilitarianism'
But by this, I could choose eating ice -cream over studying philosophy.
Ah, no, says Mill, because the 'higher faculties' are where the most pleasure lies. What do the facilities involve?
...there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
He goes so far as to say you hardly have a choice, or you would inevitably do nothing but choose the higher faculties, once conscious of their pleasure:.
The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification.
In short,
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.
Experiencing the higher pleasures are a kind of one-way street:
And yet people do in fact choose things that are bad for them. It is an age-old question:
"No one goes willingly toward the bad." (Plato, Protagoras, 358d).
Socrates thinks if we choose ill it is through ignorance.
Mill, similarly admits that people who do know of the higher pleasures choose wrongly:
It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower.
He explains why:
Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in 19 years sink into indolence and selfishness.
There is then something of a contradiction:
But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other.
And yet people do choose sensual pleasures over more "noble" pleasures. But he explains this thus:
Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.
In conclusion, there are many threats to enjoyment of the nobler feelings, They need time and the right conditions to flourish. Given the frequent allegorical references to shoots and growth in The Outpost, it is fascinating, if not surprising, that Mill chooses the metaphor of a plant to represent the incipient noble feelings.
Permit me an analogy: Say we have two pleasures, two types of tango movement; on the one hand, fancy tricks, no embrace, lots of excitement and the kind of thing that has many neophyte women gushing with pleasure. On the other, we have simple movements, very musical, creative, original, within a profound embrace, and an emphasis on experience of shared feeling and connection. Per Mill, those who have experienced both types of movement will choose the one they most prefer. I met a woman at a salsa event on Sunday who I never see in the milongas because she likes 'dancing tango' at alternative music events. You mean dancing movements associated with dancing tango music, to non-tango music, I said, pedantically while our mutual, non-tango-dancing friend looked on, laughing. She just doesn't like traditional tango music.
It is tempting to say that most of those who have experience of both types of dance will choose the traditional type of dancing - except of course for my most recent example! In Europe, traditional dancing is found in encuentros - and in some milongas. It is not that I speak from vast experience of encuentros, disliking the registration process. And encuentros tend to be viewed as where many of the best and most experienced, the elite, if you like (another reason I rarely go), congregate. Also, those with the time and money to be able to afford it.
And yet, it might be true that just as many good and experienced dancers disappear to the alternative tango world, it's just that those who prefer traditional dancing, don't see them. But I think not, partly because it is well known that many inexperienced dancers prefer the alternative scene, find it easier, more accessible etc. And it is not well known that all the best European dancers go to alternative milongas. On the contrary, it is well known that they don't. There are of course, exceptions.
Are traditional milongas part of Mill's higher or more 'noble' pleasures? Perhaps. I do see the neophyte or alternative style of dancing as "mere sensation", if that means "mere movement", whereas traditional dancing involves more of Mill's 'feelings'. But here I recognise that we are on dangerous ground. Don't 'alternative' dancers have feelings? Well of course they do. Are there feelings less valid then? Well, no, that would sound absurd, not to mention discriminatory and callous. What can we say other beyond that the experiences are very different? And yet there is much unsaid. That is the thing with feelings, they often seem to slip through discussion. I think there is though a pleasure and fun derived from the tricks of dance movement that is...well, here I fail again, just very different from the ?quieter, more ?subtle, more ?inward, experience of traditional tango dance.
Perhaps Mill's distinctions between higher and lower pleasures are based on a difference of sensibility, though this is not a term he uses. He does talk about "sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character" which I think he associates with higher pleasures.
Today though, we might say that the subject of pleasure is more nuanced and described differently. My highly educated Peruvian friend doesn't enjoy classical music or opera, preferring the salsa and the happy rhythms of the fiestas of his homeland. He spoke of a, uptight, malnourished, thin, well-educated, high-earning, high-achieving person, obsessed with money who enjoyed the classical refinements, disparaged the common sweatiness of salsa yet lacked things in their life, primarily happiness, enjoyment and fun.
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